This paper analyzes how the strategies of domestic firms borrowing abroad complicate the interaction between central banks and foreign exchange short sellers. If we define financial liberalization as the degree of freedom given to domestic firms to borrow abroad, we find that in the early stages of financial liberalization, foreign borrowing does not affect the stability of the currency peg, but in the advanced stages of financial liberalization, foreign borrowing destabilizes currency pegs. When this happens, we show that policies to curb currency short sellers have no effect. The paper thus formalizes the critical juncture where financial liberalization and currency pegs become incompatible policy goals. _________________________ * This paper has benefitted from comments from
There has been considerable policy debate, both in the policy area and among academics, about whether pegging a currency is wise (see, for example, Adams and Henderson (1983) , The Jurgenson Report (1983) and Obstfeld (1990) ). In this paper, we do not address the question as to whether central banks should or should not intervene in the foreign exchange market. Instead, we take central bank intervention as an established fact, and we go on to analyze how the strategies of domestic corporate borrowers complicate the interaction between central banks and foreign exchange short sellers.
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(example, Singapore). 2 The purpose of this paper is to show that if a country allows its domestic firms to borrow abroad, it may find it difficult to keep its currency peg. This means that if countries find it beneficial to embark on a policy of financial liberalization, currency pegs would probably have to be abandoned. 3 Countries would have to choose between floating their currencies or fixing their currencies; they cannot have it both ways. This is not the first paper demonstrating the incompatibility of fixed exchange rates and international capital mobility. It has been widely known to macro-economists that fixed exchange rates, independent monetary policy and international capital mobility cannot co-exist. They refer to this as the "impossible trinity," following Robert Mundell's seminal work in the 1960s. 4 The contribution of this paper is to provide another justification for this insight, a justification that arises as a result of the complex game played between central banks, foreign exchange short sellers, and domestic firms borrowing abroad. We formalize this game in a simple model, and use the model to pinpoint the critical juncture where financial liberalization and currency pegs become incompatible policy goals.
The model consists of a central bank, a foreign exchange short seller, and a domestic firm borrowing abroad. The central bank pegs its currency, which means that it commits itself to defending the currency.
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The central bank enjoys a benefit from maintaining the peg (which we do not model), but bears a cost of defense, a cost that is increasing in the amount of local currency it has to purchase for defending it, and is 3 decreasing in the strength of the economy. As would be intuitively expected, the equilibrium outcome is that the short seller attacks if and only if the fundamentals of the economy fall below a critical level.
The introduction of the third agent -the domestic firm borrowing abroad -complicates the interaction between the central bank and the foreign exchange short seller. The key insight of our paper is that corporate borrowers are the first movers in the game between them, foreign exchange short sellers and the central bank. They make foreign borrowing decisions based on their expectations of future exchange rate pegging policies, and these expectations are upheld in equilibrium. This leads to the main result of this paper: the foreign exchange short seller is the marginal agent in the early stages of financial liberalization, but the corporate borrower is the marginal agent in the later stages of financial liberalization. The intuition for this main result in our paper is as follows.
In the early stages of financial liberalization, the tax on foreign borrowing is high. To compensate for this, the firm will only borrow abroad if it expects the central bank to defend the local currency in all but the weakest states of the economy. The firm knows that the central bank can fulfil this expectation if the volume of currency sales by the other agents is below a low number. The firm also knows that, unfortunately, the currency sales by the foreign exchange short sellers is higher than this low number. So expectations of the firm are not fulfilled, and in a Nash equilibrium, the firm will not borrow abroad. So the only participant will be the foreign exchange short seller. He becomes the marginal agent. So the central bank's fight is only with foreign exchange short sellers, and these short sellers have to be curbed to strengthen the hand of the central bank.
In the later stages of financial liberalization, the tax on foreign borrowing is low. So the firm will not need as much compensation for borrowing abroad as before. This implies that it will borrow abroad even if it expects the central bank not to defend the local currency in all but the strongest states of the economy.
The firm knows that the central bank can fulfil this expectation if the volume of currency sales by the other agents is below a high number. The firm also knows that the currency sales by the foreign exchange short 4 seller is lower than this high number. Currency sales from the corporate borrower repaying his foreign loan, therefore, will make up the difference. Expectations of the firm will be fulfilled, and we will have a Nash equilibrium where the firm will borrow abroad. It is important to note here that if the currency sales of the foreign exchange short seller are decreased (increased) by regulatory action, the corporate borrower, knowing this, will borrow more (less) to keep his expectation of the total currency sales unchanged. It is in this sense that the corporate borrower becomes the marginal agent. This means that if the central bank wants to strengthen its hand in its defense of the local currency, the agent it needs to curb is the domestic corporate borrower and not the foreign exchange short seller. This could be achieved by raising the tax on domestic borrowing abroad, or by any other regulatory means that makes borrowing abroad more difficult. It cannot be achieved by "bashing" foreign exchange short sellers.
That raises a paradox. Why would the government want to curb its domestic firms from borrowing abroad if the country has embarked on a course of financial liberalization that, among other things, was intended to encourage, not discourage, its domestic firms from borrowing abroad? The only resolution to this paradox is to realize that currency pegs and financial liberalization may be incompatible policy objectives after a point. One of them has to go after this critical juncture is reached.
There is some evidence supporting our prediction that in the advanced stages of financial liberalization, the instability of currency pegs may be a consequence of foreign borrowing by domestic corporations. Since late 1992, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Britain, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Mexico, the Czech Republic, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Russia, Brazil, Turkey have been forced to abandon currency pegs. Argentina, recently, was forced to abandon its currency board, which is "harder" than a currency peg. The devaluations in South-East Asia in 1997 were particularly 6 Indonesia fell 80%; South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand fell 35%-50%.
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In Korea, debt maturing within a year exceeded $100 billion, which was more than 10 times its foreign exchange reserves. The top 30 chaebol had an average debt-equity ratio of 400% (compared with 70% in the United States). In Thailand, the debt to foreign banks jumped from $29 billion in 1993 to $69 billion by mid-1997, 70% of which had a maturity of less than a year. In Indonesia, the ratio of foreign bank debt to GDP after the devaluation was 140%; most Indonesian banks and firms became technically bankrupt. (Economist, March 7, 1998 , and the Oxford Analytica Brief (1997)) 5 dramatic. 6 Equally remarkable was the level of foreign borrowing by domestic firms in these countries. 7 In a recent paper, Henn (2003) , in an examination of the currency crises in Latin America -Mexico (1994-95) , Brazil (1998-99) and Argentina (2000-02) , finds that all of them had foreign exchange anchors that became unsustainable due, among other reasons, to excessive debt.
Many observers, both in academia and in the financial press, singled out this foreign borrowing binge on the part of domestic firms as a significant contributor to the crisis. In academia, a partial list of papers that did this would include Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001) , Allen and Gale (2000) , Bris and Koskinen (2002) , Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1999) , Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003), Chang and Velasco (1998) , Chan-Lau and Chen (1998), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) , Dornbusch (1998) , Edison, Luangaram and Miller (1998) , Gande, John and Senbet (1999) , Harvey and Roper (1999) , Krugman (1998) , Kumhof (1997) , McKinnon and Pill (1996) , Pomerleano (1998), and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) .
Our paper fits in the above literature. What differentiates our paper from the above literature is that we focus on the effect the domestic firms have on the relationship between the central bank and the foreign exchange short sellers. Since the defense of a currency peg is essentially a non-cooperative game between a central bank and foreign exchange short sellers, where short sellers base their strategies on their estimation of the strength of the economy and their conjecture of central bank policy, and central banks formulate their intervention policy taking into account the anticipated reactions of short sellers, we think it is important to model how this game and its results change when an important third agent -the domestic firm borrowing abroad -enters. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper which has analyzed this particular role of the domestic borrower.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section I we lay out the rules of the game between the three important players determining the stability of currency pegs -the central bank, the foreign exchange short seller and the domestic firm borrowing abroad. In Section II, we invoke no-arbitrage arguments to show the relationships between certain economic variables. The interactions between the central bank and the foreign exchange short seller, and between the central bank and the domestic firm borrowing abroad, are analyzed in Section III. We bring all the agents together in Section IV, where the main results of our paper are presented. Section V concludes with a discussion on future avenues for research.
I. The Model
There are three players in our model: a central bank, a foreign exchange short seller, and a domestic firm borrowing abroad. There are two time points, t=0 and t=1. Our model is adapted from Morris and Shin (1998) . We introduce a third agent in their model -the domestic firm borrowing abroad -and we reduce the number of short sellers in their model to one. This is because the focus in our paper is to study the strategic interactions between three different types of agents, whereas the focus in Morris and Shin (1988) is to study the coordination problem between many foreign exchange short sellers.
We explain below what each of these three agents do at each time point.
A. The Central Bank and its Economic Environment
The central bank strives to defend a pegged currency at each of the two time points. The external environment of the economy at each time point is characterized by a set of fundamentals, , which is assumed to be independently drawn from a uniform distribution, whose support is the interval [0, 1] . If turns out to be high, we interpret this to mean that the fundamentals of this economy relative to the world are strong, and the central bank finds it easy to defend its currency; if turns out to be low, we interpret this to mean that the fundamentals of this economy with respect to the world are weak, and the central bank finds it difficult to defend its currency. So is a summary statistic of every macro economic variable that has 8
The equilibrium determination of exchange rates is a vast and controversial literature. See pages 345-437 in Sercu and Uppal (1995) for a lucid description of the various approaches that have been used to model the supply and demand of currencies. A particular attractive feature of Morris and Shin (1998) is that they skirt these controversies by summarizing the effect of all primitive parameters that are supposed to affect exchange rates in one summary statistic -. This allows them to tell their story without needless distractions. Similarly, we interpret in this paper as a summary statistic of the economic fundamentals of a country that affects its exchange rates. We, however, can broaden the interpretation of to include factors outside the country that also affects its exchange rates. This means that our model can accommodate contagion, a phenomenon where the local economy suffers a crisis because of a crisis outside its borders (example, the Mexican "tequila" crisis of 1994, the Asian "flu" of 1997 or the Russian "virus" of 1998). Contagion could be rational (see Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) for a careful analysis of the rational determinants of contagion in foreign exchange markets) or irrational (see Daouk and Trivedi (2003) 
B. The Foreign Exchange Short Seller
The foreign Let r (r*) be the domestic (foreign) risk-free interest rate. If the foreign exchange short-seller borrows one unit of the local currency from the local market for short-selling at time t=0, his borrowing cost is (1+r) in local currency. He converts this local currency to foreign currency at time t=0, invests it for one period in foreign risk-free bonds, and obtains (1+r*) in foreign currency at time t=1. He reconverts it back to local currency at time t=1. His revenue at time t=1, is (1+r*)e 0 /e 1 ( 1 )) , where e 0 and e 1 ( 1 ) are the exchange rate at time t=0 and the exchange rate at time t=1 respectively. So the cost of carry of the short in local currency is [(1+r) -(1+r*)e 0 /(e 1 ( 1 ))]. In foreign currency, which is the numeraire currency of the foreign exchange short-seller, the cost of carry of the short is [(1+r)/e 0 -(1+r*)/(e 1 ( 1 ))]. If the central bank
wins, e 0 = e 1 ( 1 ), and so the foreign exchange short-seller's loss is (r-r*)/e 0 in units of foreign currency at time t=1. If the central bank loses, e 0 > e 1 ( 1 ), and so the foreign exchange short-seller's profit is [(1+r*)/(e 1 ( 1 )) -(1+r)/e 0 ] in units of foreign currency at time t=1. Equation (8) below will show that r > 9 A similar argument is made in market micro structure models to restrict agents to buy or sell just one share (see Glosten and Milgrom (1985) ). 10 r*. This implies that the foreign exchange short-seller's loss at time t=1 if the central bank wins is always positive. This means that the foreign exchange short seller will not take a short position at time t=0 if he discovers that 1 > * because, if this is the case, the central bank will win for sure and the foreign exchange short seller will lose for sure at time t=1. We will now assume that the maximum value of e 1 ( 1 ), when 1 is in the region 0 1 * , is lower than (1+r*)e 0 /(1+r). This ensures that the foreign exchange shortseller's profit at time t=1 when the central bank loses -[(1+r*)/(e 1 ( 1 )) -(1+r)/e 0 ] -is always positive. This will ensure that the foreign exchange short seller will always take a short position at time t=0 if he discovers that 1 * because, if this is the case, the central bank will lose for sure and the foreign exchange short seller will win for sure at time t=1. The above assumption thus captures the notion that foreign exchange short sellers attack only after they detect a central bank vulnerability when the economy is weak.
The above formulation of short seller payoffs assumes that the foreign currency is the numeraire currency for the short seller, an assumption that could easily be changed, but that would make the algebra more tedious without adding any economic insight. We now need an assumption to restrict trade sizes. This assumption is needed because if we do not restrict trade sizes, risk-neutral agents will either not short-sell or short-sell infinite amounts. 9 So, with some loss of generality, we assume that the currency short sellers will short-sell 0 or short-sell S.
C. The Domestic Firm
The domestic firm has a domestic project that requires an investment of one unit local currency at t=0. If undertaken, these projects return R in local currency at t=1. The domestic firm is risk-neutral. Its objective is to maximize its expected profits at t=1. The numeraire currency for the domestic firm is the local currency.
The domestic firm has no money of its own. It can finance the project by either borrowing from domestic banks at an interest rate r d (which is endogenous and would be determined later) or by borrowing 10 Any policies that curb the inflow and/or outflow of foreign capital to and from a country are capital control policies. These regulations include, but are not limited to, prohibition or tax on local institutions raising money abroad, prohibitions or tax on foreigners selling foreign financial assets locally or buying local financial assets, prohibitions or tax on interest and dividends earned by locals investing abroad or foreigners investing locally, reserve requirements, and time-intensive approval requirements. As all these regulations are "sand-in-the-wheel" regulations, they can be modeled, with some loss of generality, as a tax on the profits of the local firm that borrows abroad.
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In our model, since the domestic firm is risk-neutral, and since default has no costs like loss of tax shelters or loss of managerial reputation, the firm has no incentive to hedge. In the real world, however, firms do hedge. In our model, if the firms hedge at time t=0, the provider of the hedge will insure the firm against default in the event of a currency devaluation at time t=1. However, now, instead of the firm selling local currency to buy foreign currency to repay its loan at time t=1, it will be the provider of the hedge who will be doing this. Therefore, though default has been averted, the selling of local currency at time t=1 by an agent other than the foreign exchange short-seller has not been averted. The results of our model will still go through. The results of our model will not go through if the provider of the hedge does not sell local currency to provide foreign currency at time t=1, but does it, if at all, at a future time. In that case, we appeal to a recent paper by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) , who explain that agents always undervalue insuring against an exchange rate depreciation because of financing constraints in emerging markets. So, though they may be risk-averse, firms in reality choose to hedge very little at time t=0.
from foreign banks at an interest rate r f (which is also endogenous and would be determined later). It has to make its investment and borrowing decision at t=0, so unlike the short sellers and the central bank, its decision cannot be contingent on the realization of the fundamental 1 at t=1.
As the domestic firm faces the choice of whether to borrow locally or borrow abroad at t=0, it seems natural for us to define the existing government policy of financial liberalization as the degree of freedom given to domestic firms to borrow abroad. In particular, assume that the government can tax the local currency profits of the domestic firm if it borrows abroad. 10 Let the tax rate be t B . The lower is the tax, the higher is the level of financial liberalization achieved by this country.
If the domestic firm borrows from the foreign bank at time t=0, it may choose to hedge at t=0 the currency risk it will face at t=1, but because it is risk-neutral, this is not an issue.

D. Other Players
Foreign banks are risk-neutral and they operate in a competitive environment. So they make zero expected profits. They can offer an interest rate r f to the domestic firm. This interest rate r f is influenced by the risk-free interest rate that the foreign bank can obtain by lending its funds in the foreign market itself.
Let this rate be r * , which is exogenous. The numeraire currency for the foreign banks is the foreign currency.
Domestic banks are risk-neutral and they operate in a competitive environment. So they too make
.
zero expected profits. They can offer an interest rate r d to the domestic firm. This interest rate r d is influenced by the risk-free interest rate that the domestic bank can obtain by lending its funds in the domestic market itself. Let this rate be r. The numeraire currency for the domestic banks is the local currency.
Domestic banks can also borrow from foreign banks and lend this money out to the domestic firm.
As a matter of fact, domestic banks are significant borrowers from abroad in emerging markets. However, since domestic banks do not have a comparative advantage over the domestic firm with regards to interactions with the foreign banks in our model, we assume, for simplification, that the domestic firm interacts directly with the foreign banks, or just uses the domestic banks as intermediaries.
The domestic firm can approach domestic banks for a loan, and since the project is riskless in the domestic currency unit and the market for domestic lending is competitive, the loan rate r d would not be more nor less than the domestic riskless interest rate, r. So
E. The Time Line
We summarize below the main events at the two time points, t=0 and t=1. We are now in a position to invoke no-arbitrage arguments to show the relationships between some economic variables.
II. Some Parity Conditions
If the domestic firm borrows from the domestic bank at t=0, its after-tax profits after paying off the loan at t=1 would be An implicit assumption in (2) is that R (1+r). This assumption is needed because if R < (1+r), no domestic bank will lend to the domestic firm.
If the domestic firm approaches the foreign bank for a loan, the loan rate it will receive is r f . It will borrow one unit of local currency for the project at t=0, which is equivalent to borrowing e 0 units of foreign currency from the foreign bank. As r f is the loan rate, the payment due at t=1 is e 0 (1+r f ) units of foreign The above discussion implies that if the central bank is able to defend its currency -e 1 remains at e 0 -at time t=1, the probability of which occurring is conjectured to be 1-* , the domestic firm can repay from its revenue its obligations to the foreign bank as well as pay a foreign borrowing tax to its government.
Therefore, its after-tax profits at time t=1, in units of the local currency, is
. If, on the other hand, the central bank is not able to defend its currency at time t=1, the probability of which occurring is conjectured to be * , the domestic firm defaults. In that case, the domestic 13 We can easily incorporate these costs of bankruptcy. The effect this would have in our model is to discourage foreign borrowing, but since the borrowing tax t B achieves just that, we do not gain more economic insights by adding this variable. firm has no profits, and so it does not have to pay any tax. So, in units of local currency, the expected profits of the domestic firm at time t=1 is Equation (3) assumes that there is no direct or indirect cost of bankruptcy when the domestic firm fails to pay its foreign bank. 13 For both local borrowing and foreign borrowing to coexist, the domestic borrower has to be indifferent between borrowing locally and borrowing abroad. So (2) The foreign bank can lend e 0 in foreign currency to foreign riskless borrowers at t=0 and, as r * is the foreign riskless rate, it would get back at t=1 in units of foreign currency Alternatively, it could lend e 0 in foreign currency to the domestic firm at t=0. If the central bank is able to defend its currency at t=1, the probability of which occurring is conjectured to be 1- 
the other hand, the central bank is not able to defend its currency at t=1, the probability of which occurring is conjectured to be * , the domestic firm defaults on its payments, and the foreign bank gets to keep whatever the domestic firm has, which is e 1 R in units of foreign currency. So, in units of foreign currency, its expected takings at t=1 are Competition among foreign banks ensures that the rate foreign banks charge domestic corporate firms are driven down till (5) equals (6). This gives us
As we had assumed that default occurs when there is devaluation, the lending rate the foreign bank obtains by lending to the domestic firm that can default, r f , has to be greater than the riskless foreign lending rate, r * . If we substitute out r f from (4) and (7), we get:
The domestic risk-free interest rate, r, will be linked to r*, the exogenous foreign risk-free interest rate, through the uncovered interest rate parity relationship. However, conventional uncovered interest rate parity -(1+r) = (1+r*))e 0 /E(e 1 ) -as given in international finance textbooks, will not hold here. To see why, notice that if we substitute the expression for conventional uncovered interest rate parity in the left-hand side of equation (8), the left-hand side simplifies to e 0 /E(e 1 ). As e 0 > E(e 1 ), the left-hand side is greater than 1. The right-hand side of equation (8) is less than 1. So (8) cannot be an equation if conventional uncovered interest rate parity held.
The intuition why conventional uncovered interest rate parity relationship cannot hold in our economy is as follows. Conventional uncovered interest rate parity assumes, among other things, frictionless borrowing and lending between countries. In our economy, if the domestic bank is not charged a tax on foreign borrowing, but the domestic firm is, the domestic firm will use the domestic bank as an intermediary to borrow from abroad and, consequently, will pay no tax. This violates an integral assumption in our model.
To prevent this tax shelter, the government can either forbid domestic banks from borrowing abroad or it can levy a tax on the domestic bank if it borrows abroad, a tax that makes the domestic borrower indifferent to using a domestic bank as an intermediary and not using a domestic bank as an intermediary. In this case, some domestic banks will lend only locally at an interest rate r, whereas other banks will act as intermediaries with the same local lending rate r. This means that though r may be assumed to be exogenous, it is linked to r* through equation (8). Equation (8), therefore, is the uncovered interest rate parity of our model economy.
Note two facts about equation (8). First, as the RHS of (8) is less than 1, so should the LHS of (8).
This means that the denominator of (8) This lemma is important because it tells us that the central bank may, under circumstances we shall determine later, increase the stability of the currency peg (lower the * , higher is the stability of the currency peg) by raising foreign borrowing taxes (increasing t b ).
We are now in a position to analyze the interactions between the various agents.
III. The Interactions Between the Various Agents
A. Interaction between the Foreign Exchange Short Seller and the Central Bank when there are no Domestic Firms Borrowing Abroad
It is clear from our previous discussion that the foreign exchange short seller, after observing the fundamental 1 at time t=0, will not short-sell at t=0 if he observes that 1 > * , because it is his conjecture that the government can successfully defend its currency at t=1 if 1 > * , and he will lose if he short-sells.
On the other hand, the short seller will short-sell at t=0 if he observes at t=0 that 1 * , because it is his conjecture that the government will surrender at t=1 if 1 * , and he will gain if he short-sells.
How do we obtain a * in a Nash equilibrium? The answer to this question is given in our next proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: The point at which the central bank surrenders is * . It is the point of intersection of horizontal line S and m( 1 ) in Figure 2.
As this result is so intuitive, we prefer to give a graphical proof using Figure 2 . If the short seller conjectures that the defense of the currency will be successful at t=1 if 1 > * , and will not be successful at t=1 if 1 * , his optimal strategy is to short-sell at t=0 a quantity S( 1 ). S( 1 ) will equal S if 1 * , and will be zero if 1 > * . S ( 1 ) is given by the solid line with arrows in Figure 2 . This line tells us that there will be no short-selling to the right of * . Why short-sell when you will lose for sure? This line also tells us that a quantity S of the local currency will be short-sold to the left of Conjectures on the other's strategies are upheld, and we have a Nash equilibrium.
_____________________
Insert Figure 2 about here _____________________ Define the stability of a currency peg as the probability that the peg will be defended. In our model, this is just 1-* . So, if * increases, we conclude that the currency peg has become more unstable. Figure   2 substantiates some of our intuitive hunches on the stability of currency pegs. First, a curb on foreign exchange short sellers lowers S, which from Figure 2 is seen to lead to a decrease in * . So the currency peg becomes more stable if foreign exchange short sellers are curbed. Second, recall that we defined m ( 1 ) as the value of m which solved c(m, 1 ) = v ~ 1 ( L , H ]. This was interpreted in Figure 1 as the minimum currency sales that is needed by others to force the central bank to surrender the defense of its currency. So, for a given 1 , if c increases, m( 1 ) will decrease. As weaker central banks have a higher cost of defense, the curve m( 1 ) is lower in Figure 2 , which is seen to lead to an increase in * . So the currency peg is more unstable for weaker central banks.
It should be noted here that these results may not hold when domestic corporate borrowers are present.
B. Interaction between the Domestic Firm and the Central Bank when Foreign Exchange Short Sellers do not Exist
It is clear that, unlike the short seller and the central bank, the domestic corporate borrower signs its loan contract at t=0 before the realization of 1 . Recall that we argued that if domestic and foreign loan markets have to co-exist, there cannot be any arbitrage between these two markets. This implies that the 19 domestic firm has to be indifferent between borrowing abroad and borrowing locally. Therefore, the domestic firm will mix its strategy. It will borrow some money abroad and it will borrow some money locally. How do we pin down how much of the foreign currency the domestic firm wants to sell at t=1 to repay the foreign loan it acquired at t=0 in a Nash equilibrium? The answer to this question is given in our next proposition. ( 1 ) in Figure 3 .
As this result is also intuitive, we prefer to give a graphical proof using 
COROLLARY 1: Higher is the stage of financial liberalization (lower t B ), more unstable is the currency peg (higher * ).
The proof follows directly from lemma 1. It should be noted here that these results may not hold when short sellers are present.
We are now in a position to bring all agents together, solve for the Nash equilibrium, and analyze the properties of the equilibrium.
IV. The Effect of Financial Liberalization on the Stability of Currency Pegs
We will analyze two regimes: a regime in the early stages of financial liberalization and a regime in the advanced stages of financial liberalization. In the first regime, domestic firms are discouraged from borrowing abroad by the imposition of high tax rates on profits earned by borrowing abroad; in the second regime, domestic corporate borrowers are encouraged to borrow abroad by the lowering of these tax rates.
For us to be able to make a precise distinction between these two regimes, we have to define a variable t * .
Solve for * in Figure 2 . It is the point of intersection of the horizontal line S with the curve m ( 1 ) in Figure 2 . Define . We are now in a position to define the two regimes. If t B > t * , we will interpret this to mean that domestic firms are discouraged from borrowing abroad by the imposition of high tax rates on profits earned by borrowing abroad. This is a regime which is in the early stages of financial liberalization. If t B < t * , we will interpret this to mean that domestic firms are encouraged to borrow abroad by the lowering of the tax rates on profits earned by borrowing abroad. This is a regime which is in the advanced stages of financial liberalization.
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Let us now try to solve for the Nash equilibrium of a regime that is in the early stages of financial liberalization. Once we solve for this equilibrium, we will analyze how the various deep parameters of the economy, especially policy variables, can affect the stability of the currency peg.
A. The Early Stages of Financial Liberalization
Domestic corporate borrowers are discouraged from borrowing abroad by the imposition of high tax rates on profits earned by borrowing abroad. Here t B > t * . This is a regime which is in the early stages of financial liberalization. optimal strategy is to not borrow foreign currency at t=0. Why? As * = s > b ( t B ), and as b ( t B ) is the conjecture which makes the domestic firm indifferent between borrowing abroad and borrowing locally, if * = s is its conjecture, it will not borrow abroad. This is because the region in which the currency is defended has shrunk, and so borrowing abroad is dominated by borrowing locally (see equation (8) Theorem 1 and its corollaries present an interesting set of conclusions. They tell us that in the early stages of financial liberalization, it is the foreign exchange short seller that is the marginal player. If the objective of the central bank is to peg its currency, which means that the central bank has committed to "defend" its currency in times of currency weakness, it is the foreign exchange short seller that is the "enemy". Therefore, if the central bank wants to strengthen its hand in its defense of the currency, the only agent it needs to curb is the foreign exchange short seller. This could be achieved by any regulatory means that makes short-selling of the local currency more difficult.
We now try to solve for the Nash equilibrium of a regime that is in the advanced stages of financial liberalization. Once we solve for this equilibrium, we will analyze how the various deep parameters of the economy, especially policy variables, can affect the stability of the currency peg.
B. The Advanced Stages of Financial Liberalization
The domestic firm is encouraged to borrow abroad by the imposition of low or zero tax rates on profits earned by borrowing abroad. Here t B < t * . This is a regime which is in the advanced stages of financial liberalization. Figure 5 .
We give a graphical proof by using Figure 5 . If the short seller conjectures that the defense of the currency will be successful at t=1 if 1 > * , and will not be successful at t=1 if 1 * , his optimal strategy is to short-sell at t=0 a quantity S( 1 ). S ( 1 ) 14 In a previous version of the paper, we had explicitly formalized how the government "curbed" foreign exchange short sellers. It was in the same way the government had curbed foreign borrowing: tax. We had assumed that foreign exchange short sellers were heterogenous in their fixed cost of transaction. This implied that only a proportion of them, those whose revenues exceeded their fixed costs, would short-sell when they detected central bank vulnerability. This meant that as the tax on profits made on foreign exchange short selling, t s , increased, or as the fundamentals, 1 , increased, the proportion of potential foreign exchange short-sellers taking part would decrease. In other words, S was S( 1 , t s ), and the first partial derivative of S with respect to both 1 and t s were negative. So instead of a horizontal line S to the left of m ( 1 ) Corollary 5 is the key result of our paper. The intuition for this result is as follows. In the later stages of financial liberalization, the tax on foreign borrowing is low. So the firm will not need as much compensation for borrowing abroad as before. This implies that it will borrow abroad even if it expects the central bank not to defend the local currency in all but the strongest states of the economy. The firm knows that the central bank can fulfil this expectation if the volume of currency sales by the other agents is below a high number. The firm also knows that the currency sales by the foreign exchange short seller is lower than this high number. Currency sales from the corporate borrower repaying his foreign loan, therefore, will make up the difference. Expectations of the firm will be fulfilled, and we will have a Nash equilibrium where the firm will borrow abroad. It is important to note here that if the currency sales of the foreign exchange short seller are decreased (increased) by regulatory action, the corporate borrower, knowing this, will borrow more (less) to keep his expectation of the total currency sales unchanged. It is in this sense that the corporate borrower becomes the marginal agent.
Corollary 5 tells us that if the objective of the central bank is to peg its currency, which means that the central bank has committed to "defend" its currency in times of currency weakness, it is the domestic firm borrowing abroad that is the "enemy". The foreign exchange short seller is not the "enemy". If the central bank wants to strengthen its hand in its defense of the currency, the agent it needs to curb is the domestic firm borrowing abroad and not the foreign exchange short seller. This could be achieved by raising the tax on domestic borrowing abroad, or by any other regulatory means that makes borrowing abroad more difficult.
It cannot be achieved by "curbing" foreign exchange short sellers.
14 sloping curve S( 1 ) to the left of m( 1 ) in Figures 2, 4 and 5. An increase (decrease) in the short-selling tax, t s , would lower (raise) the curve S ( 1 ) to the left of m( 1 ) in Figures 2, 4 and 5. This would result in a decrease (increase) of * in Figures 2 and 4 , but not in Figure 5 . This implied that the government could increase (decrease) the stability of the exchange rate peg by increasing (decreasing) the tax on foreign exchange short-sellers in Figures 2 and 4 -when liberalization was at its early stage -but could not affect the stability of the exchange rate peg by increasing (decreasing) the tax on foreign exchange short-sellers in Figure 5 -when liberalization was at an advanced stage. In this version of the paper, to keep the model simple, we dropped the explicit formalization on how the government "curbed" foreign exchange short sellers.
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C. Some Data
Our model has an unambiguous prediction. It predicts that in the early stages of financial liberalization, firms do not borrow abroad and they do not affect the stability of an exchange rate peg in their country, but in the later stages of financial liberalization, they borrow from abroad and they destabilize exchange rate pegs in their country. Is this observed in the data?
We obtained official financial liberalization dates from Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2003) for all the emerging markets in their sample. It is not clear whether these dates refer to an early stage of liberalization or an advanced stage of liberalization. We then obtained annual World Bank data on private borrowing from abroad by banks and non-banks in these countries. Table I gives the average annual borrowing before and after the official liberalization, where the average is taken over three years. If the country had a foreign exchange crisis, Table I also gives the average annual borrowing before and after the foreign exchange crisis, where the average is taken over three years.
The summary statistics of Table I are dramatic. Countries in which private foreign borrowing did not increase much after the official liberalization date, implying perhaps that liberalization was at an early stage, did not have a foreign exchange crisis. Nearly all countries in which private foreign borrowing increased dramatically after the official liberalization date, implying perhaps that liberalization was at an advanced stage, suffered a foreign exchange crisis. As more formal tests on this data set are beyond the scope of this paper, we would not like to over-emphasize the results in Table I , but would only want the reader to note that the stylized facts of the model do not violate those of the real world.
26
V. Concluding Remarks
As the arguments in favor of floating exchange rates are as convincing as the arguments in favor of fixed exchange rates, many governments of the world opt to have it both ways: they peg their currency to an anchor and defend their currency as long as it is feasible. Many of these governments choose to liberalize their economies as well which, among other things, allow domestic firms to borrow abroad.
If we define financial liberalization as the degree of freedom given to domestic firms to borrow abroad, this paper finds that in the early stages of financial liberalization, foreign borrowing does not affect the stability of the currency peg. This is because the foreign exchange short seller, and not the domestic corporate borrower, is the marginal seller of the local currency in the early stages of financial liberalization.
So the central bank's "fight" is with the foreign exchange short seller. However, in the advanced stages of financial liberalization, foreign borrowing destabilizes currency pegs. When this happens, we show that policies to curb currency short sellers have no effect. This is because the domestic corporate borrower, and not the foreign exchange short seller, is the marginal seller of the local currency in the advanced stages of financial liberalization. So the central bank's "fight" is with the domestic corporate borrower. This implies that financial liberalization and currency pegs are incompatible policy goals.
The above result is not new. Following Robert Mundell's seminal contributions in the 1960s, there is a large international macroeconomics literature that explains why fixed exchange rates, independent monetary policy and international capital mobility cannot co-exist. What differentiates our paper from the above international macroeconomics literature are two factors. First, we arrive at this old result in a new way: from micro-foundations in the international corporate finance literature. Second, we make precise the financial liberalization state before which financial liberalization and currency pegs are compatible policy goals, but after which financial liberalization and currency pegs become incompatible policy goals.
Our contribution to the international corporate finance literature is the following. To the models that have been developed in this literature to formalize problems that occur when investment is done with the 27 money of foreigners -the risk sharing and moral hazard involved in domestic firms borrowing from foreign banks under a promise of pegged exchange rates, offshore short-term borrowing to fund onshore long-term illiquid assets, inefficient monitoring systems, lack of transparency, weak corporate governance, and crony capitalism -we add one more model -how domestic corporate borrowers complicate the interaction between central banks and foreign exchange short sellers.
We believe this is an important issue because, as a currency peg basically implies that a central bank has committed itself to "defend" the currency against foreign exchange short sellers, it is important to understand precisely how, if at all, domestic corporate borrowers make this "defending" job more difficult.
This, as far as we know, has not been formally explored before. Also, as far we know, no one had formally showed that corporate borrowers, and not foreign exchange short sellers, were the defending central bank's "enemy" in the advanced stages of financial liberalization.
Our work suggests several avenues for future research. First, we assumed that the payoff of the project undertaken by the domestic firm is deterministic. Though this dramatically simplified our analysis, it would be interesting to introduce uncertainty here. That would allow us to examine the effect of asymmetric information (domestic banks know more about domestic borrowers than foreign banks do) and/or moral hazard (foreign banks may be encouraged to lend to riskier projects than domestic banks if they believe that the central bank will successfully defend its currency), issues that other commentators have raised in past currency crises. Second, we assumed that the input and the output of the project were generated in local currency. It would be interesting to note how our results would change if the numeraire currency for the input/output changed. Considering that many of the countries that had to abandon their currency pegs in 1997 were export-oriented countries, this would mean that they probably had a significant proportion of their output in foreign currency. But perhaps the most important, and certainly the most challenging extension to our work, would be to give the central bank an option of currency regimes, and ask which dimensions of financial liberalization are compatible with each type of currency regime. 
